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SUPPLIER DISCRETION OVER PROVISION: THEORY 





Suppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured 
patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the 
purchaser observes what is supplied but can observe neither recipient type nor the actual cost 
incurred, optimal provision differs from what would be efficient if the purchaser had full 
information, whether or not the supplier can extract informational rent. The analysis is applied 
to, among other things, data on tests for coronary artery disease and to Medicare diagnosis-
related groups defined by the treatment given, not just the diagnosis, illustrating the biases in 
provision that result. 
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Medical specialists decide which treatment to provide to patients ￿ whether, for example,
to treat coronary artery disease surgically with a bypass graft or non-surgically. Auto repairers
havediscretionaboutrepairingorreplacingpartsoffully-insuredautosdamagedinanaccident.
Firms follow the advice of specialist suppliers about what computers to provide for employees.
Providers of social care decide what services to supply to welfare recipients. Schools decide
what special needs provisions to make for individual pupils. In all these cases, the choice of
precisely what is to be supplied is left to the discretion of the supplier, with payment based
on what the supplier provides. This paper is concerned with payment arrangements in such
settings.
The settings analysed here differ from the procurement models in Laffont and Tirole (1993)
in two fundamental respects. The ￿rst is the supplier’s discretion over precisely what to supply.
In some cases, such as emergency medical care, that discretion arises from the need for a
speedy decision. But even where it is feasible to give the discretion to an agent employed
by the purchaser (for example, a health service gatekeeper), employing an agent costs money
and has its own incentive problems, see Malcomson (2004). Whatever the reason, in practice
discretion is often left to the supplier. The second important difference is that payment to the
supplier is not conditioned on the actual cost incurred in supplying each individual recipient.
An important practical reason is the dif￿culty of monitoring the cost actually incurred. With
health services, this was a major motivation for the shift from fee-for-service payment, based
essentially on the cost of the services actually supplied to a patient, to prospective payment,
based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) de￿ned by the patient’s basic diagnosis and also
frequently, as McClellan (1997) emphasises, by the speci￿c procedure used to treat the patient.
When the supplier has discretion, the purchaser paying for provision needs to consider
how payment arrangements affect not only the cost, but also the appropriateness, of provision.
To investigate the implications, this paper uses a framework with two varieties of provision
(treatment, computer system, social care service, etc.) that might be appropriate for a recipient.
Recipients differ in type, which is observed by the supplier before deciding which (if either)
of the two varieties to supply but not observed by the purchaser. For some recipient types, one
variety of provision is ef￿cient (in the sense of maximising the net bene￿t as assessed by the
purchaser), for some the other, and for some neither. The purchaser can verify which variety
is provided for each recipient but not the cost incurred in providing it. Recipients make no
payments to the supplier. Those made by the purchaser can be conditioned only on the variety
supplied.
Two special cases of this framework are the following. First, the purchaser can be the
same as the recipient provided type is not known to the recipient. In many of the applications,
however, these two are distinct so the distinction is retained here. Second, type can be a cost
characteristic of a monopoly supplier unknown to the purchaser. Then the model is similar
in spirit to Baron and Myerson (1982) with output restricted to three possible levels, though
1the setting is in other respects richer. Armstrong and Sappington (2005) survey the literature
developed from that paper.
Critical for determining what provision is optimal in this setting are two properties of the
costs of provision. The ￿rst property is whether there are recipient types for whom neither
variety is ef￿cient who are cheaper to supply than those for whom provision of some variety
is ef￿cient. Because ef￿cient provision depends on bene￿ts as well as costs, that can certainly
be the case. If there are, these types will always receive provision if other types do, so there
is necessarily some distortion away from ef￿cient provision. If there are not, the purchaser
can ensure that only those for whom some variety is ef￿cient receive provision by setting the
payments for providing each variety appropriately. The second property concerns how the
difference in the cost of supplying the two varieties changes with recipient type. If it changes
in one direction, an appropriate difference in payment between the two varieties can ensure
that those for whom some provision is ef￿cient receive the variety that is ef￿cient for them.
If it changes in the other direction, inducing the supplier to respond in that way is simply not
feasible. If the supplier can be prevented from receiving a rent from its information about
recipient types, the difference between optimal and ef￿cient provision is determined entirely
by these constraints on feasibility. If, however, the supplier cannot be prevented from receiving
such a rent, optimal provision is adjusted in order to reduce that rent. This may result in some
types receiving the variety that is ef￿cient for them when that would not otherwise be the case.
I am aware of only a small literature on settings similar to that analysed here, all of it
concernedspeci￿callywithDRGsfordifferentmedicaltreatmentsforthesamebasicdiagnosis.
McClellan (1996a) and McClellan (1996b) both consider two possible treatments given the
basic diagnosis. Neither is concerned with the optimal choice of DRG prices. Instead, they
are concerned with the implications of DRG prices that follow a speci￿ed (and not, in general,
optimal) rule on hospital investment in capacity to carry out the treatments, on physicians’
allocation of patients to the treatments, and on patients’ choices of which hospital to attend.
The results here, in contrast, are concerned with prices that are optimal for the purchaser given
the rule for allocating provision to recipients that is optimal for suppliers. Miller (2004) also
analyses a setting with two potential treatments but his concern is with the structure of medical
insurance, speci￿cally whether it is more ef￿cient to have insurance provided by the health
maintenance organisation supplying treatment or by a third-party insurer. His conclusion is
that it is more ef￿cient to have a third-party insurer, the case analysed here of a purchaser
separate from the supplier. Siciliani (2003) too analyses a setting with two potential treatments
but under very speci￿c assumptions about costs of treatment (increasing linear cost functions),
bene￿ts of treatment (the same for both treatments and all patient types), and the distribution of
patient types (uniform). Those assumptions correspond to a special case of one of the four cases
considered here. His primary concern is with how optimal DRG prices vary across hospitals
with different distributions of patient types.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the model used for the analy-
sis. Sections 3 and 4 derive results on optimal prices for the two varieties of provisions for
2different cost con￿gurations. Section 5 applies the results to medical care. The basic issue
there is how the cost and bene￿t characteristics relevant for the economic analysis relate to the
characteristics of medical treatments. Section 6 discusses other applications.
2 The model





what provision (if any) is appropriate. The distribution of types in the population served by the





of provision are available, variety l appropriate for low s recipients and variety h appropriate
for high s recipients. The cost of providing variety i to a recipient of type s is ci .s/ > 0
for i 2 fl;hg, which is differentiable. (Appendix A extends the model to the case in which
costs are affected by the supplier’s choice of effort.) The cost functions and the distribution of
types are known to both purchaser and supplier. In addition, before arranging for supply, the
supplier observes a recipient’s type but this remains unknown to the purchaser, as does the cost
actually incurred in supplying the recipient. The purchaser can, however, monitor costlessly




for which the appropriate provision is so obviously apparent that no supplier would consider
giving the less appropriate one.
The monetary value of the bene￿t ascribed by the purchaser to a type s recipient receiving
provision of variety i is denoted bi .s/, which is positive and differentiable. For a public sector
purchaser of health or social care, this may be simply the bene￿t to the recipient. For a ￿rm
buying computers, it is the increased pro￿ts that result. The formulation is consistent with
the purchaser being the recipient if the bene￿t is independent of s so that s is not revealed
to the purchaser once the bene￿t is known. A purchaser paying from public funds attaches a
premium ￿ > 0 to payments, so the social cost of provision is .1 C ￿/ci .s/. For a private
sector purchaser, ￿ D 0. The net bene￿t of provision is thus bi .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/ci .s/. To capture
the property that variety l is appropriate for low s and variety h for high s, types s are ordered




and s00 2 .s0;s] satisfying
bl .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/cl .s/ > max[0;bh .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/ch .s/]; for s 2 [s;s0/; (1)




bl .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/cl .s/ < bh .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/ch .s/ < 0; for s 2 .s00;s]: (3)
The term ef￿cient provision is used here for the provision that maximises the net bene￿t to the
purchaser. Conditions (1)￿(3) ensure that variety l is ef￿cient for recipients of type s 2 [s;s0/,
variety h is ef￿cient for recipients of type s 2
￿
s0;s00￿
, and neither variety is ef￿cient for
recipients of type s 2 .s00;s]. Either l or h is ef￿cient for s D s0, either h or no provision for




to receive one or other provision, then s00 D s, in
which case it is assumed that bh
￿
s00￿




3As typically assumed in procurement models, the purchaser makes a ￿take it or leave it￿
contract offer to the supplier. In the present case, a contract P D fp0; pl; phg consists of prices
pi that the purchaser pays the supplier for providing a recipient with variety i 2 fl;hg and a
payment p0 for each potential recipient, whether or not supplied. (By the taxation principle,
see Guesnerie (1995, Chapter 1), just one price per provision is a characteristic of an optimal
direct mechanism.) The payment p0 may, in principle, be negative but then the supplier has
no interest in notifying the purchaser of a potential recipient who receives no provision. A
purchaser who cannot monitor these is effectively constrained to set p0 ￿ 0. Both possibilities
are analysed in what follows. The supplier’s payoff from providing variety i to a recipient of
type s is
ui .s/ D pi C p0 ￿ ci .s/: (4)
The supplier’s reservation payoff is normalised to zero.1
Let Si .P/ denote the subset of types provided with variety i 2 fl;hg when the contract is











ph ￿ ch .s/
￿
f .s/ds ￿ 0: (5)
Since p0 is paid whether or not provision is made, it affects provision only through this par-
ticipation constraint. Moreover, since the supplier provides variety i 2 fl;hg to type s only if
pi ￿ ci .s/ ￿ 0, the constraint p0 ￿ 0, when imposed, is always tighter than (5).
It is convenient to nest the objective functions of pro￿t-maximising and social-welfare-
maximising purchasers within a single formulation. For a pro￿t-maximising purchaser, the
gain from having variety i 2 fl;hg provided to a recipient of type s is the bene￿t less the price
paid, bi .s/ ￿ .pi C p0/. The gain from no provision being supplied to a potential recipient is











bh .s/ ￿ ph
￿
f .s/ds ￿ p0: (6)
It is clearly optimal to set p0 at the lowest level consistent with the participation constraint (5)
and the constraint p0 ￿ 0 when the latter is required. Since the latter is a tighter constraint,
it holds with equality when imposed. Otherwise, the participation constraint (5) holds with
equality and can be used to substitute for p0 in (6). To cover both cases, let ￿ D 1 when p0 is
constrained to be non-negative and ￿ D 0 when p0 is not so constrained so that expected pro￿t
1The results that follow are easily extended to a supplier whose payoff depends on the bene￿t of provision to
the recipient, as sometimes argued for physicians and for non-pro￿t suppliers, see Newhouse (1970) and McGuire
(2000). If the supplier’s payoff is ui .s/ D pi ￿ vi
￿
E ci .s/;bi .s/
￿
, where E ci .s/ is the monetary cost of providing
varietyi totypes andbi .s/thebene￿t, theresults that followstill applywhenci .s/isde￿ned asvi
￿
E ci .s/;bi .s/
￿
.







































bh .s/ ￿ .1 ￿ ￿/ch .s/ ￿ ￿ph
￿
f .s/ds: (7)
For a social-welfare-maximising purchaser, the gain from having variety i 2 fl;hg provided
to a recipient of type s, denoted wi .s/, consists of the bene￿t bi .s/ to the recipient, plus the
utility ui .s/ to the supplier, less the social cost of paying for provision from public funds. Thus,
wi .s/ D bi .s/ C ui .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/.pi C p0/
D bi .s/ ￿ ci .s/ ￿ ￿ .pi C p0/; (8)
the second equality following from the de￿nition of ui .s/ in (4). For a potential recipient for
whom no provision is made social welfare is ￿￿p0. Thus the expected social welfare from















Since ￿ > 0 for such a purchaser, it is again optimal to set p0 at the lowest level consistent with
the participation constraint (5) and the constraint p0 ￿ 0 when the latter is required. Since,
as with a pro￿t-maximising purchaser, the latter is a tighter constraint, it holds with equality
when imposed. Otherwise, the participation constraint (5) holds with equality and can be used
to substitute for p0 in (9). In this case, let ￿ D ￿ when p0 is constrained to be non-negative and







































bh .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿ ￿ ￿/ch .s/ ￿ ￿ph
￿
f .s/ds: (10)
The objectives (7) of a pro￿t-maximising purchaser (for whom ￿ D 0) and (10) of a social-
















￿ D 0 for either type of purchaser without constraint p0 ￿ 0;
￿ D ￿ for a social-welfare-maximising purchaser with constraint p0 ￿ 0;
￿ D 1 for a pro￿t-maximising purchaser with constraint p0 ￿ 0:
Cases with ￿ D 0 correspond to the supplier’s participation constraint (5) binding, so the sup-
plier receives no informational rent from provision. In these cases, prices can be set solely to
optimise provision of the two varieties to different types of recipients. In cases with ￿ > 0, the
supplier receives an informational rent corresponding to minus the terms multiplied by ￿, so
optimal prices need also to take account of rent extraction from the supplier.
A useful benchmark is the best outcome the purchaser could achieve if able to monitor s
costlessly. Ef￿cient provision, as de￿ned by (1)￿(3), could then be a condition of payment.
Expected pro￿t, and with ￿ > 0 also expected social welfare, is maximised by paying the
supplier ci .s/ for providing variety i to a recipient of type s. Then both expected pro￿t W￿ in
(6) and expected social welfare Wsw in (9) are given by
Z s0
s
[bl .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/cl .s/] f .s/ds C
Z s00
s0
[bh .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/ch .s/] f .s/ds: (12)
The characteristics of optimal provision depend critically on two properties of the cost func-
tions ci .s/. The ￿rst critical property is whether cost of provision is increasing or decreasing in
s. If cost is increasing in s, an appropriate choice of prices will induce the supplier to provide
for low s types without providing for higher s types. Thus it is feasible, though not necessarily
optimal, toexclude from provisionall types s 2 .s00;s] thatit is ef￿cientto exclude whileensur-
ing provision for all types s 2 [s;s00/. In contrast, if cost is decreasing in s, higher s types will
always receive provision, whether or not that is ef￿cient, if prices are high enough to induce
the supplier to provide for lower s types. Both increasing and decreasing costs are considered
here. The second critical property is whether the difference in cost between varieties h and l is
decreasing or increasing in s. If this difference is decreasing, variety l is relatively less costly
to provide than variety h for lower s so appropriate choice of prices will induce the supplier to
provide l for lower s and h for higher s. Thus it is feasible, though again not necessarily opti-
mal, to ensure that types lower than s0 are provided with the variety l that is ef￿cient for them
while ensuring that any higher types who receive provision receive variety h. If the difference
is increasing, ef￿cient partition between the varieties provided is simply not feasible. To ensure
that the cost functions have the single-crossing property, the following assumption is used for
6c0
l .s/;c0
h .s/ > 0 c0
l .s/;c0
h .s/ < 0
￿ D 0 l to s 2 [s;s0/; either no provision or l to
h to s 2 .s0;s00]I s 2 [s;s0/;h to s 2 .s0;s]I
c0
h .s/ < c0
l .s/
￿ > 0 l to s 2 [s; O s￿/; if l and h: l to s 2 [s￿
l ; O s￿/;
possibly h to s 2 .O s￿;s￿
h]; h to s 2 .O s￿;s];
where O s￿ < s0;s￿
h < s00I where s ￿ s￿
l < O s￿; O s￿ > s0I
￿ D 0 either l or h to s 2 [s;s￿
i ]; at most one of l and h to s 2
where s￿
i ￿ s00, for i D l;hI [s￿
i ;s];s￿
i < s00, for i D l;hI
c0
h .s/ > c0
l .s/
￿ > 0 if l and h: h to s 2 [s; O s￿/; if l and h: h to s 2 [s￿
h; O s￿/;
l to s 2 .O s￿;s￿
l ]; l to s 2 .O s￿;s];
where s0 < O s￿ < s￿
l < s00I where s￿
h < O s￿ < s0:
Table 1: Optimal provision
most of the results below.










The main results derived below are summarised in Table 1. The rows classify cases by
whether the difference in cost ch .s/￿cl .s/ between the two varieties of provision is decreasing
or increasing and also by whether the supplier receives an informational rent (￿ > 0) or not
(￿ D 0). The columns classify cases by whether the costs of provision cl .s/ and ch .s/ are
increasing or decreasing. This table serves as a guide to the propositions that follow. Examples
of medical care that fall into each of the four categories in the table are given in Section 5, other
applications in Section 6. These can be read in conjunction with Table 1 without recourse to
the detailed arguments in Sections 3 and 4.
3 Optimal prices with cost non-decreasing in s
When costs are strictly increasing in s, a supplier faced with ￿xed prices always supplies to
lower s types if supplying to higher s types. The ￿rst part of this section analyses that case. It
corresponds to the left-hand column in Table 1.





Suppose the purchaser were to set only a single price p for provision of either variety l or
h. A supplier providing to type s will then always supply whichever variety costs less, thus
7incurring cost c.s/ given by

















bl .s/; if cl .s/ < ch .s/I
max[bl .s/;bh .s/]; if cl .s/ D ch .s/I
bh .s/; if cl .s/ > ch .s/;












With the same price p for both varieties and c0
i .s/ > 0, the supplier provides some variety
for all recipient types s for which c.s/ ￿ p. Thus, if the purchaser sets price p D c.Q s/, all










[b.s/ ￿ .1 C ￿ ￿ ￿/c.s/] f .s/ds ￿ ￿c.Q s/ F .Q s/: (15)
Anoptimalpriceisthusc.Q s￿/for Q s￿ thatmaximisestheexpressionin(15). The￿rstproposition
characterises Q s￿. All proofs are in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the purchaser sets a single price for
provision of both varieties. Then an optimal price p satis￿es p D c.Q s￿/, where Q s￿ D s, or














Q s￿￿ F .Q s￿/
f .Q s￿/
: (16)








, Q s￿ > s.
This result illustrates two fundamental points. First, while by manipulating the price the
purchaser can determine how far up the interval from s to s the cutoff point Q s for provision is,
when ￿ > 0 it is never worth raising that cutoff as far as s00, at which all those for whom some
varietyisef￿cientreceiveprovision. Thereasonisthatraisingthepricetoinducethesupplierto
provide for higher s types increases the informational rent on provision for infra-marginal types
given by the right-hand side of (16). Second, with just one price, the supplier provides any type
s receiving provision with whichever variety costs less. Thus if, for example, ch .s/ < cl .s/ for
all s, the supplier provides only variety h and any types s < s0 receive that variety even though
variety l is ef￿cient for them. By setting different prices for the two varieties, the purchaser can
in￿uence both the types that receive each variety and the informational rent to the supplier.
8It is straightforward to specify conditions under which (16) has a unique solution. One set
of conditions is bi .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿/ci .s/ decreasing for i 2 fl;hg, ci .s/ convex for i 2 fl;hg,
and F .s/ log concave (that is, F .s/=f .s/ non-decreasing) for all s. The last of these is
commonly assumed in the literature on contracting under asymmetric information (see Laffont
and Tirole (1993)) and is satis￿ed by such standard distributions as the normal, the uniform and
the chi-squared. Under those additional assumptions, the left-hand side of (16) is decreasing
and the right-hand side non-decreasing, so there can be at most one solution. Uniqueness is
not, however, required for the results derived here.
For different prices set by the purchaser, consider Figure 1 in which cj .s/ and ck .s/ are
the increasing cost functions and j may correspond to either l or h. Suppose the purchaser
sets prices pj and pk. For s > sk, cost is greater than price for both varieties, so the supplier
provides neither. For s < O s, the difference between price and cost is greater with variety j, so




, that difference is greater for variety k, so the supplier




















;i 2 fl;hg: (17)
In words, si is the highest s to whom the supplier is willing to provide variety i given pi. De￿ne
k 2 fl;hg by
sk D max.sl;sh/: (18)
Thus sk is the highest s to whom the supplier provides either variety given pl and ph. By
Assumption 2, all of sl;sh and sk are unique for given pl; ph. Finally, de￿ne O s by
O s D
(







Under Assumption 1, O s is unique for given pl and ph.
Consider O s D s. By the de￿nition of k in (18) and Assumption 1, for j 2 fl;hg and j 6D k,
pk ￿ ck .s/ > pj ￿ cj .s/ for s 2 .sj;sk]. With ci .s/ continuous for i 2 fl;hg, this must also




if there is no s satisfying the top line of (19). Thus, if O s D s, the supplier
provides variety k to any s receiving provision. If O s > s, the supplier provides variety j to
recipient types s 2 [s; O s/, variety k to types s 2 .O s;sk], and neither variety to s 2 .sk;s]. It is
indifferent to which variety is provided for type s D O s. Given this decision rule of the supplier,










[bk .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿ ￿ ￿/ck .s/] f .s/ds
￿ ￿
￿




















variety j variety k neither variety
Figure 1: Supplier provision decisions with increasing costs








without loss of generality because,





D 0 and pj does not enter the maximand (20). Moreover, given (17) and (18), pk can
be replaced by ck .sk/. With these substitutions, the purchaser’s optimization problem can be











[bk .s/ ￿ .1 C ￿ ￿ ￿/ck .s/] f .s/ds
￿ ￿
￿





















































































































> 0, so these necessary
























































Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for optimal prices, there exist s￿
k 2 .s;s00]





such that the supplier provides recipient types s 2 [s; O s￿/ with





with variety k, and recipient types s 2 .s￿
k;s] with
neither variety. If O s￿ > s, O s￿ satis￿es (22). If O s￿ D s, the left-hand side of (22) must be
non-positive. If ￿ > 0, s￿
k < s00:
Lemma 1 establishes that the supplier provides one variety j to recipient types below O s￿,
the other variety k to recipient types between O s￿ and s￿
k, and neither variety to recipient types
above s￿
k. It does not, however, specify whether j corresponds to l or to h ￿ that depends on
whether ch .s/￿cl .s/ is increasing or decreasing. Consider ￿rst the case ch .s/￿cl .s/ strictly











1. It is always strictly optimal to ensure variety l is provided.
2. It is strictly optimal to ensure variety h is provided if








for s D s￿
l de￿ned by (23) with k D l. Condition (24) holds for all s 2 .s0;s].
3. If it is optimal to have both varieties provided: (a) variety j of Lemma 1 corresponds to
l and variety k to h; (b) O s￿ ￿ s0 and s￿
h ￿ s00, with the inequalities strict for ￿ > 0; and
(c) optimal prices p￿

























in the case ￿ > 0.
4. For ￿ D 0, both varieties are provided, O s￿ D s0 and s￿
h D s00.
Proposition 2 corresponds to the upper left box in Table 1. The key to understanding it is
that, with ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly decreasing, the relative cost of providing variety l is lower for
lower s types and l corresponds to j in Figure 1. Since it is low s types for which variety l is
ef￿cient, with appropriate prices the supplier could be induced to provide each variety to those,
and only those, for whom that variety is ef￿cient. For ￿ D 0 (that is, upfront payments ensure
11the supplier expects no rent from provision), that is optimal, as Part 4 of Proposition 2 shows.
For ￿ > 0; however, that is not optimal because of the informational rent the supplier would
receive. Providing for more types requires an increase in price to cover the higher cost. But
that increases the rent to the supplier on all infra-marginal types in exactly the same way as
discussed in connection with Proposition 1. The essential point can be seen from (23). The
left-hand side corresponds to the net bene￿t of providing variety k to the marginal type s￿
k. The
right-hand side, which is strictly positive for s￿
k > s when c0
k .s/ > 0 and ￿ > 0, corresponds
to the deadweight loss from the increased rent the supplier receives on all s < s￿
k. Because
of that increased rent, it is optimal to stop short of having provision made for those for whom
the net bene￿t of provision, while still positive, is suf￿ciently low. But, as shown in Part 1
of Proposition 2, it is always optimal to ensure that variety l, at least, is provided because for
type s there are no infra-marginal types being treated, so it is always worth ensuring that they
receive l. Moreover, if for the type s￿
l that would be marginal in the event that only variety l
were provided the relative bene￿t of providing variety h is suf￿ciently large, then it is optimal
also to have variety h provided. That is the content of Part 2 of Proposition 2.
If both varieties are provided when ￿ > 0, it is not optimal to have variety h provided for
those for whom the net bene￿t is suf￿ciently small because of the increased rent the supplier
would receive, so s￿
h < s00. But it is also, for a similar reason, optimal to have some for
whom variety l is ef￿cient receive variety h. That can be seen from (22). With j D l and
k D h, the left-hand side is the difference in the net bene￿t of type O s￿ receiving variety l
over receiving variety h. The right-hand side is the difference in the informational rent from
inducingthesuppliertoprovidetype O s￿ withvarietyl ratherthanvarietyh. Withc0
l .s/ > c0
h .s/,
the additional rent from having type O s￿ supplied with l is greater than from having that type
supplied with h. At an optimum, this additional rent just counterbalances the reduced net gain
from having type O s￿ supplied with h. This means setting O s￿ < s0. The results on relative
















given O s￿ < s0.
A number of conclusions for when it is preferable to use two different prices follow directly
from Proposition 2. First, if a single price would result in only variety h being provided (be-
cause, for example, ch .s/ < cl .s/ for all s), it follows from Part 1 that there is a strict gain
from having two different prices. Second, if a single price would result in only variety l being
provided (because, for example, cl .s/ < ch .s/ for all s) and Q s￿ > s0, it follows from Part 2
that there is a strict gain from having two different prices whenever (24) is satis￿ed. Third, Part
3 gives conditions for the two prices to be different. A particular case in which one of those
conditions holds is that studied by McClellan (1996b) and widely assumed to apply to hospital
treatments, namely the treatment appropriate for low cost cases is less costly for all recipients
(though less bene￿cial for at least some). Then cl .s/ < ch .s/ for all s, and in particular for
s D s0, so p￿
l < p￿
h. Another case is that in which the bene￿ts of the two varieties are the same









h provided ￿ > 0. Finally, even if it is optimal to have only one variety provided,
it may still be necessary to have two different prices. If, for example, it is optimal to have only
variety l provided but cl .s/ > ch .s/ for all s, the supplier would provide only variety h if the
prices for the two were the same.











1. Either O s￿ > s0 or O s￿ D s.
2. For ￿ D 0, only one variety i 2 fl;hg is provided, with s￿
i ￿ s00.
3. If it is optimal to have both varieties provided: (a) variety j of Lemma 1 corresponds to
h and variety k corresponds to l; and (b) optimal prices p￿


















The results in Proposition 3 correspond to the lower left box in Table 1. With ch .s/ ￿
cl .s/ strictly increasing, variety h corresponds to j in Figure 1. While, as with ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/
strictly decreasing in Proposition 2, it is still always optimal to ensure that at least one variety
is supplied (that follows from sk > s in Lemma 1), it is no longer necessarily variety l. The
reason is that, when ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ is strictly increasing, the relative cost of providing l rather
than h is higher for low s types for whom variety l is ef￿cient. Thus, to ensure that low s types
receive variety l, ph will have to be set suf￿ciently low that nobody receives variety h.
For ￿ D 0 (that is, the supplier receives no informational rent) the implication is that only
one variety is provided. If both were provided, some for whom variety l is ef￿cient would
receive variety h and some for whom variety h is ef￿cient variety l. So, unlike the case ￿ D 0
under the conditions of Proposition 2, the ef￿cient outcome is not feasible. If instead only
one variety is provided, one of those inef￿ciencies is removed and, with no concern for rent
extraction from the supplier, that increases the purchaser’s payoff. Which variety it is optimal
to provide depends on whether the loss in payoff is less from providing types s < s0 with






For ￿ > 0, there is the additional issue of extracting rent from the supplier. If it is optimal
to provide both varieties in order to do this, Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that O s￿ > s0. The
implication is that not only do all those with s ￿ s0 for whom variety l is ef￿cient receive
variety h, but also some types s > s0 for whom variety h is ef￿cient. The reason is that, if
O s￿ < s0, no types for whom variety h is ef￿cient actually receive it, so it would be better not
to have variety h supplied at all. But providing variety l, even if only to some types s > s0 for
whom variety h is ef￿cient, may reduce the rent to the supplier. With ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly
increasing, and hence c0
h .s/ > c0
l .s/, the cost for variety l rises less steeply as s increases than
the cost for variety h. So providing variety l to additional types at the margin requires less
increase in price, and hence less additional rent to the supplier on infra-marginal types, than
13providing variety h. That is re￿ected in the ￿rst-order condition (23). With c0
h .s/ > c0
l .s/, the
right-hand side of (23) is smaller for given s if k D l than if k D h, so it may be that more types
receive provision of some variety when variety l is provided even when the left-hand side is
larger for k D h. Again, the results on relative prices when both varieties are provided follow








. The conditions given in Part 3






given that O s￿ > s0.
The case with non-decreasing cost not covered by Propositions 2 and 3 is that in which the
difference between ch .s/ and cl .s/ is the same for all s, so c0
h .s/ D c0
l .s/ for all s. Then,
unless prices are set such that pl ￿ cl .s/ D ph ￿ ch .s/, only one of the varieties will be
supplied. So even a small mistake would have a big effect on the provision made. Moreover,
the effect on the purchaser’s payoff need not be small because the ￿wrong￿ variety is provided
to infra-marginal types for whom the difference in bene￿t between the two varieties may be
large. Thus, even if the purchaser is only slightly uncertain about the supplier’s costs for the
two varieties, the implications could be major.
Provided the purchaser sets the prices exactly right, the supplier is indifferent as to which
variety is supplied for any s when c0
h .s/ D c0
l .s/. The supplier would then be willing to provide
each s with whichever variety the purchaser would prefer. Since, the right-hand side of (22)
is zero in this case, it follows from that condition and from (1) and (2) that the supplier would
wish to have O s￿ D s0, with variety l provided to s < s0 and variety h to all types s > s0
who receive provision. Then, all those types who receive provision receive the variety that is
ef￿cient for them. But, for c0
h .s/ > 0 and ￿ > 0, the right-hand side of (23) is strictly positive,
so it follows from (2) that it is not optimal to provide for all those types for whom provision
would be ef￿cient. Only in the cases c0
h .s/ D c0
l .s/ D 0 or ￿ D 0 is some provision supplied
for all those for whom it is ef￿cient. If the costs of the two varieties are actually the same,
then a single price (pl D ph) is optimal. The supplier is, however, equally willing to supply
not what the purchaser wants but what the recipient wants, a possibility that seems plausible in
the context of provision of, in particular, medical care. It is assumed in much of the literature
that physicians are in￿uenced by what their patients want even if this is not what the purchaser
would want￿see the survey by McGuire (2000). In that case, it is potentially disastrous to
leave the supplier indifferent for each s as to whether provision is made and, if it is, which
variety of provision. The supplier will then provide each s with whichever variety has higher
bene￿t to the patient and will provide some variety as long as the higher of the two bene￿ts
is positive. Thus decisions on which variety to provide will be made entirely on the basis of
bene￿t to the patient, without consideration of cost. Only in special cases, for example, the two
varieties cost the same and s00 D s so that it is ef￿cient to provide for all types, will this result
in ef￿cient decisions about the variety to be provided.
144 Optimal prices with cost decreasing in s
The previous section analysed optimal prices with costs of provision non-decreasing in s. This
section analyses optimal prices with costs of provision decreasing in s, corresponding to the
right-hand column in Table 1.





The implication is that potential recipients for whom neither variety of provision is ef￿cient
are the cheapest to supply instead of the most expensive. That is the only change in assump-
tion from the previous section. In particular, the speci￿cation of which variety of provision is
ef￿cient in (1)-(3) is retained. As before, both ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ decreasing and ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ in-
creasing are considered. The analysis of both these cases closely mirrors that of the preceding
section, so the arguments are presented only brie￿y.
The analysis with Assumption 3 is illustrated in Figure 2, which differs from Figure 1 in
that costs are now decreasing. Thus, if the supplier’s payoff from providing type s with variety
i is positive, the payoff from providing types higher than s with i is also positive. Retain the
de￿nition of si in (17) but change the de￿nition of k from that in (18) to
sk D min.sl;sh/: (25)
This is the lowest s to whom the supplier provides either variety given pl and ph. Also, change
the de￿nition of O s from that in (19) to
O s D
(
s such that ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ D ph ￿ pl, if there exists such an s 2 [sk;s]I
s; otherwise.
(26)
Under Assumption 1, O s is unique for given pl and ph. Figure 2 illustrates these de￿nitions.
Consider O s D s. By the de￿nition of k in (25) and Assumption 1, for j 2 fl;kg and j 6D k,
pk ￿ ck .s/ > pj ￿ cj .s/ for s 2 .sk;sj] and, with ci .s/ continuous for i 2 fl;hg, this must




if there is no s satisfying the top line of (26). Thus, if O s D s,
the supplier provides variety k to any s receiving provision. If O s < s, the supplier provides
variety k to recipient types s 2 [sk; O s/, variety j to types s 2 .O s;s], and neither variety to types
s 2 [s;sk/. It is indifferent to which variety is provided to type s D O s. Given this decision rule






























without loss of generality because,














variety j variety k neither variety





D 0 and pj does not enter the maximand (27). Moreover, given (17) and (25), pk
can be replaced by ck .sk/. With these substitutions, the purchaser’s optimization problem can





















































































One difference this case makes to the results of Lemma 1 is that it may now be optimal not




. The reason is that, with cost decreasing in s, the
supplier will always provide for types s 2 .s00;s] if any s ￿ s00 receive provision. But by (3)
it is ef￿cient to provide for only those types s ￿ s00 and the ef￿ciency loss from providing for
s 2 .s00;s] may more than outweigh the gain from providing for some s < s00. This applies
even if the supplier receives no informational rent (￿ D 0). It can, of course, apply only if
16s00 < s because otherwise it is ef￿cient to have provision for all types. Another difference is













suf￿ciently large. Thus s￿




and may, indeed, be at either endpoint
of this interval. The main results for cost decreasing in s corresponding to those in Propositions
2 and 3 for cost increasing in s can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 3 holds.




. If it is optimal to have
both varieties provided: (a) variety k corresponds to l and variety j corresponds to h;
(b) O s￿ > s0 for ￿ > 0 and O s￿ D s0 for ￿ D 0; and (c) optimal prices p￿
i for i 2 fl;hg
satisfy p￿
l < p￿















the case ￿ > 0.




. For ￿ D 0, it is optimal
to have at most one variety provided. If for ￿ > 0 it is optimal to have both varieties
provided: (a) variety j corresponds to l and variety k corresponds to h; (b) O s￿ < s0; and
(c) optimal prices p￿





















2 in that the cost of providing variety l relative to variety h is lowest for low s and highest for
high s, in line with what it is ef￿cient. Thus, with prices ￿xed appropriately, the supplier could
be induced to provide varietyl only to those for whom it is ef￿cient. As with Proposition 2, that
is optimal only when the supplier receives no informational rent (￿ D 0). Otherwise, to keep
down that rent, it is optimal to set prices such that O s￿ > s0, so some types for whom variety h
is ef￿cient receive variety l. But, unlike in Proposition 2, there is always a problem with types
for whom neither variety is ef￿cient if there are any (that is, if s00 < s). With cost decreasing in
s, these always receive some provision at any prices that will induce provision to any types for
whom provision is ef￿cient.
Part2ofProposition4correspondstothelowerrightboxinTable1. ItisakintoProposition
3 in that the cost of providing variety l relative to variety h is lowest for high s and highest for
low s, the opposite of what it is ef￿cient. Thus no prices will induce an ef￿cient choice of
cutoff between varieties l and h. For this reason, when the supplier receives no rent (￿ D 0), it
is optimal to have at most one variety provided ￿ any other choice would have some types for
whom variety l is ef￿cient receive variety h and some for whom variety h is ef￿cient receive
variety l, one of which can be prevented if only one variety is provided. When ￿ > 0, there is
the additional issue of reducing the supplier’s rent. If it is optimal to provide both varieties in
order to do this then, with O s￿ < s0 and j corresponding to l, all those for whom variety h is
ef￿cient actually receive varietyl. Variety h is received only by types for whom varietyl would
be ef￿cient, an outcome that can be optimal only because it enables those types to receive some
variety at a lower rent to the supplier. Again, if there are types for whom neither variety is
17ef￿cient (that is, if s00 < s), they still receive provision, in this case variety l which, in view of
(3), is even more inef￿cient for them than is variety h.
Proposition 4 completes the development of the results summarised in Table 1. The remain-
der of the paper is concerned with applications.
5 Application to medical care
An important practical application of the analysis is to the prices set for medical services, for
example prices for diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) such as those used in the US Medicare
system. McClellan (1997, p. 93) comments that, with Medicare, ￿over 40 percent of DRGs
are related not to diagnoses . . . but to the performance of speci￿c intensive procedures￿ (over
220 out of 480 DRGs in 1993). Different procedures for the same basic diagnosis correspond
to different varieties of provision in the model used here. Moreover, ￿xed payments per patient
for each DRG (which correspond to prices in the model) account for the vast majority of total
payments, 95% averaged over all DRGs according to McClellan (1997).2 The model applies to
differences in patient type for which the appropriate choice of treatment is a matter of genuine
medical judgement. Costs and bene￿ts in the model correspond to the expected costs and
bene￿ts given the information about a patient’s condition at the time of decision.
The results derived here can be applied directly to data from cost-effectiveness studies such
as Patterson et al. (1995) of different test procedures for coronary artery disease (CAD). Two
basic test procedures are compared there: (1) coronary angiography, a high-precision but inva-
sive procedure with non-negligible risks, by itself; and (2) initial use of a lower precision but
less costly and non-invasive procedure, followed by coronary angiography for those with posi-
tive results on the initial test. The initial tests considered are Exercise ECG (ExECG), Positron
Emission Tomography (PET), and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT).
The study derives the expected cost of each procedure and the expected bene￿t in terms of the
gain in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) for different pre-test probabilities of CAD based
on patient characteristics observable to a physician. To calculate the net bene￿t as de￿ned here
requires only values for QALY gain and, in the case of a social-welfare-maximising purchaser,
the social cost of public funds ￿. Figure 3 shows the net bene￿t for given pre-test probabili-
ties for a value of $50,000 per QALY gain (a ￿gure widely used in the literature) and ￿ D 0.
For these values, coronary angiography by itself and PET followed by coronary angiography
2Since hospitals are required to report the costs of treatment for individual patients, the potential exists for
conditioning payment on cost by using an optimal cost-sharing payment of the type discussed in Baron and My-
erson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993)￿supply-side cost sharing in the terminology of Ellis and McGuire
(1993). Indeed, reported costs are actually used to determine cost outlier payments for unusually expensive pa-
tients. Newhouse (1996) has put the case for using more cost-based payment for health services, Chalkley and
Malcomson (2000) review the formal models, and Chalkley and Malcomson (2002) assess the cost savings that
might be achieved if cost sharing were extended to all Medicare treatments. However, one of the main reasons
for moving to DRG-based payments was concern about the extent to which reported costs re￿ect the true costs of
providing the appropriate treatment for patients. Fixed payments avoid the need to monitor costs effectively for
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Figure 3: Net bene￿ts of tests for coronary artery disease, $50,000 per QALY, ￿ D 0, other
data from Patterson et al. (1995)
between them always dominate for all pre-test probabilities, so only these two procedures need
to be considered. The former has higher net bene￿t for probabilities above 0.25, the latter for
probabilities below 0.25. These conclusions are reasonably robust to the value of a QALY.
With the value halved or doubled, coronary angiography and PET still dominate and the ef￿-
cient cutoff between them changes by less than 0.1.
To apply the results derived here, it is necessary to assess how pre-test probability of CAD
relates to patient type s and how costs change with s. Although bene￿ts and costs for pre-
test probabilities less than 0.1 are not given in the study, bene￿t cannot be positive for a pre-
test probability of zero and so net bene￿t becomes negative as the pre-test probability goes to
zero. To correspond to the speci￿cation in (1)￿(3), higher s must correspond to lower pre-test
probability. Thus coronary angiography corresponds to variety of provision l that is ef￿cient
for low s and PET to variety h, with s0 corresponding to a pre-test probability of approximately
0.25. The value of s00 at which net bene￿t becomes negative cannot be calculated from the
data in the study but this turns out not to affect the application. Figure 4 shows the expected
costs of the two dominating procedures for given pre-test probabilities. The cost for PET
increases substantially with pre-test probability, primarily because there is a greater likelihood
of following it with coronary angiography, that for coronary angiography does not increase
signi￿cantly and is treated as constant in the study. With s measured inversely to pre-test
probability, this is a case with cost decreasing in s, corresponding to the right-hand column
in Table 1. (A constant cost of coronary angiography does not create a problem for this.)
Moreover, with coronary angiography corresponding to l and PET to h, c0
h .s/ ￿ c0
l .s/ < 0.
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Figure 4: Costs of tests for coronary artery disease, data from Patterson et al. (1995)
prices are set high enough that the supplier is willing to provide tests to type s, it is also willing
to supply to any higher types. So if any s ￿ s00 receive a test, s > s00 who want a test will
also receive one. If, despite this, it is worthwhile having either test procedure applied (which
presumably it is given their widespread use) and if the supplier receives no ex ante rent (￿ D 0),
it is optimal to set prices so that the cutoff between angiography and PET is at the ef￿cient
level corresponding to a pre-test likelihood of approximately 0.25. With a constant cost to
coronary angiography, the optimal price is necessarily equal to that cost, so p￿
l D $5;500.
To induce the supplier to choose the optimal cutoff, the price of PET has, by (26), to be set
so that the difference between price and cost for the two procedures is the same for s D s0.
That gives p￿
h ￿ $3;800. If the supplier cannot be prevented from receiving an ex ante rent
(￿ > 0), it is optimal to set ph lower than that so that the cutoff is above s0 (that is, at a pre-test
probability of CAD below 0.25, resulting in some types for whom PET is ef￿cient receiving
coronary angiography). Precisely how much lower depends on the distribution of patient types
but, however much it is, p￿
l > p￿
h as in Part 1 of Proposition 4. With the cost of angiography
the same for all types, there is no rent to the supplier from providing this so, with net bene￿t
positive for all s < s0, it is optimal to provide the procedure for all these types.
This application illustrates an important point about the speci￿cation for which a price
is paid. Since the procedure using PET consists of two separate tests (PET itself, followed
eventually by coronary angiography if the result from PET is positive), it would be possible
to price the two parts separately, with that for coronary angiography paid only if it is actually
carried out. That would result in two procedures both with costs more or less independent of s.
Butthatmightnotbeinthepurchaser’sinterestforthetworeasonsgiveninthediscussionofthe
20constant cost case at the end of Section 3. First, if price is set equal to cost for both, the supplier
may use the procedure the patient prefers rather than the one the purchaser prefers. Second, if
the prices are not set precisely right, the supplier will provide only one of the procedures despite
it being optimal to have both supplied. By specifying PET followed by coronary angiography
as a single variety of provision with cost decreasing in s, the purchaser ensures that the supplier
strictly prefers one procedure to the other for all but the cutoff type and that marginal errors
in pricing result in only marginal deviations from the optimal cutoff. On the other hand, with
constant costs for both procedures, the purchaser can avoid the supplier receiving ex ante rent
and the supplier may choose not to provide either procedure for those for whom net bene￿t is
negative. The optimal speci￿cation depends on which of these dominates.
The application just considered corresponds to the upper right box in Table 1. Some ex-
amples illustrate the remaining boxes. Consider ￿rst a condition such as a malignant tumour
that may be treated either surgically (by, for example, an operation to remove the tumour) or
non-surgically (by, for example, radiotherapy or chemotherapy). The surgical treatment has
a high probability of success in less severe cases but beyond a certain level is less likely to
be effective than the non-surgical treatment and its cost increases substantially with severity.
The non-surgical treatment consists of a standard course with probability of success decreas-
ing with severity and cost increasing less rapidly than with surgical treatment. For very severe
conditions, the probability of any treatment being successful is so low that it does not warrant
the reduction in the patient’s immediate quality of life. In this case, it is very severe conditions
that have negative net bene￿t from treatment, so higher s corresponds to a more severe case,
surgical treatment corresponds to treatment l that is more appropriate for less severe (low s)
cases, non-surgical treatment corresponds to treatment h that is more appropriate for more se-
vere (high s) cases, ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ is decreasing, and ci .s/ is increasing for i D l;h. That puts
this condition into the upper left box in Table 1.
To illustrate the lower half of Table 1, consider a condition with characteristics similar
to those of the preceding example except that the choice is now between surgery alone and
surgery combined with non-surgical treatment. An example would again be a malignant tu-
mour but where the treatment choices are surgical removal of the primary tumour either alone
orincombinationwithfollow-upradiotherapyorchemotherapy. Asinthepreviouscase, higher
s corresponds to a more severe condition, surgery corresponds to treatment l that is more ap-
propriate for less severe cases, the combined treatment corresponds to treatment h that is more
appropriate for more severe cases, and ci .s/ is increasing for i D l;h. The difference from the
previous case is that, because the cost of the combined treatment is the cost of surgery plus that
of the non-surgical treatment, its cost increases more rapidly with severity than that of surgery
alone, so ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ is increasing, instead of decreasing. That puts this condition into the
bottom left box in Table 1.
As an example of the remaining box in Table 1, consider a condition that can be treated
surgically at a cost increasing only mildly with severity, managed non-surgically at a cost that
increases with severity more rapidly than surgery, or not treated with the patient told to come
21back if distressing symptoms recur. An example would be gall bladder disorders for which
total cholecystectomy may be expected to leave all severities in a similar condition (no gall
bladder) but may be inappropriate for cases of only mild or infrequent distress. Then higher
s corresponds to a less severe condition, surgical treatment corresponds to treatment l that is
more appropriate for more severe (low s) cases, medical management corresponds to treatment
h that is more appropriate for less severe (high s) cases, and ci .s/ is decreasing for i D l;h. In
this case, ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ is increasing, which puts it into the lower right box in Table 1.
In the two examples just given, as in the application to tests for coronary artery disease,
it follows from the results in Table 1 that supplier rents lead to optimal prices that result in
provision of more expensive treatments to patients for whom less expensive ones would be ef-
￿cient. This illustrates an important point: over-provision of higher-cost treatments to patients
for whom lower-cost treatments would be ef￿cient may result simply from an optimal pricing
strategy on the part of the purchaser.
In general, optimal prices for the two varieties in the model are different which, in the
Medicare context, implies that it is optimal to have the two treatments in different DRGs. The
only systematic exception to this when both varieties are provided is when they both have the
same cost for all types, in which case they must obviously have the same price if the supplier
is to be willing to supply both. In other cases, it is possible for the optimal price to be the same
when both varieties are provided but that is essentially coincidental in the sense that the optimal
cutoff between recipients receiving one variety and those receiving the other just happens to be
at a value of s at which the cost of the two varieties is the same. In general that is not the
case because the optimal cutoff depends on relative bene￿ts as well as relative costs. It is also
possible for the optimal price to be the same if it is optimal to have only the cheaper variety
provided to any recipients. The results here provide a guide as to which price needs to be
higher.
Sometimes there are more than two potentially appropriate varieties of provision, which
may call for more pricing categories. McClellan (1997) gives the example of patients admitted
with ventricular arrhythmia, with three different types of medical treatment: medical man-
agement (with three corresponding DRGs in 1993), electrophysiologic stimulation (with one
DRG), and automatic implantable cardiac de￿brillator placement (with two DRGs). Extending
the model to handle this creates no conceptual problem; it just multiplies the number of cases
to consider. But, in practice, the administrative costs of having additional pricing categories
may limit the extent to which it makes sense to add to the number.
6 Other applications
To illustrate application of the model to a pro￿t-maximising purchaser consider the repair of
insured autos mentioned in the Introduction. In that case, the supplier is the repairer who
inspects the damaged auto and decides what action to take. The repairer can repair the damaged
parts, replace them, or claim that the damage is the result of wear and tear or neglect and
22so not covered by the insurance (no provision). Repair is typically more appropriate for less
extensive damage than replacement so, with s corresponding to the extent of the damage, repair
corresponds to provision l and replacement to provision h, with the cost of repair increasing
more rapidly with the extent of damage than the cost of replacement. With either repair or
replacement, the insurer’s obligation is met in full, so b is the same and independent of s. (It
makes no difference to the analysis if the customer pays a ￿xed deductible. An extension might
have the bene￿t affected by whether the customer is suf￿ciently satis￿ed to continue to use the
insurer, in which case it might depend on s.) No provision costs the supplier nothing but may
result in the insurer facing possible litigation that results in lower expected bene￿t than repair
or replacement. Provided the expected bene￿t from no provision is lower when damage is more
severe (the customer, for example, is more likely to litigate when the repair cost is high), this
application falls into the upper left box in Table 1.
To illustrate the case in which the purchaser is also the recipient, suppose the purchaser
has a task to be repeated a number of times. The task can be carried out in-house at known
cost without specialist equipment (no provision) or outsourced to a monopoly supplier who
can use either of two pieces of specialist equipment, one with lower ￿xed but higher marginal
cost than the other. The lower ￿xed cost equipment requires retaining some in-house staff to
do pre-processing work, so the bene￿t to the purchaser depends on the equipment used. The
marginal cost to the supplier of outsourcing with either equipment depends on a parameter s
unknown to the purchaser, so the purchaser does not know which method of doing the task
is ef￿cient for the number of repetitions required. In-house supply (no provision) is ef￿cient
when the marginal cost of outsourcing is high, so higher s corresponds to higher marginal cost.
If the equipment ef￿cient for outsourcing with s low has marginal cost increasing more rapidly
with s than that ef￿cient for outsourcing with s high, the application falls into the upper left
box in Table 1. If less rapidly, it falls into the lower left box.
These applications illustrate how the results established here apply to pro￿t-maximising
purchasers, not just those concerned with social welfare. Those results show how optimal
provision differs from ef￿cient provision in the face of supplier discretion and how prices need
to be set to achieve optimal provision.
Appendix A Endogenous effort to reduce cost
Suppose the cost of providing variety i to a recipient of type s is O ci .s;e/ > 0 for i 2 fl;hg,
where e 2 [0;e] with e > 0 is the effort (measured, without loss of generality, by the monetary
value of its disutility) to which the supplier goes to keep down the cost for this recipient. The
cost function O ci .s;e/ is differentiable with respect to both s and e and both decreasing and





. These properties ensure that higher effort reduces cost and that ef￿cient effort
is unique and interior to the interval [0;e]. Suppose also that the supplier’s disutility from
providing variety i to a recipient of type s is O ci .s;e/ C e. Thus, if fully reimbursed for the
23actual cost of variety, the supplier sets e D 0 for both varieties. With a ￿xed price pi for variety
i, the supplier’s utility from providing variety i to a recipient of type s is





If variety i is provided to a recipient of type s, the supplier selects effort e D ei .s/ given by
￿
@O ci .s;ei .s//
@e





This, as is well known to be the case with ￿xed price payment, is the ef￿cient effort. The
assumptions made here ensure ei .s/ 2 .0; N e/. Now de￿ne the functions ci .s/ as follows:





The function ci .s/ gives the total cost to the supplier, monetary plus non-monetary, of provid-
ing variety i to recipient type s conditional on choosing ef￿cient effort ei .s/. By the envelope
theorem, c0





de￿nition of ci .s/, all the results in the main text continue to apply.
If, with this extension of the model, O ci .s;e/ D Q ci .s/ ￿ e, it makes no difference whether
the purchaser can observe cost when provision is made and condition payment on that because
the supplier can choose e to achieve any desired level of cost without affecting the payoff in
(A.1).
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The ￿rst-order condition that must be satis￿ed by any Q s￿ at which the

























Equation (16) is a straightforward rearrangement of this. Consider other possibilities for the
case ￿ > 0. For any s > s, F .s/ > 0. It follows from (2), (3) and continuity that the maximand
in (15) is strictly increased by reducing Q s for any Q s ￿ s00. Thus Q s￿ < s00. Given this, the only
points at which a maximum may occur with the maximand not differentiable are s and s0.
Under Assumption 1, if s0 exists it is unique. For ￿ D 0 (the only alternative to ￿ > 0), the
same argument implies Q s￿ ￿ s00 and thus does not rule out Q s￿ D s00, which will be at a boundary
if s00 D s. But, for Q s￿ D s00, the left-hand side of (16) is then zero, so (16) still holds with








, the supplier chooses variety l for s in the neighbourhood
of s if these receive provision. It follows from (1) that Q s D s cannot be a maximising value of




D 0, so the right-hand derivative with respect to Q s of the maximand in (15) is
strictly positive.
24Proof of Lemma 1. It follows directly from Assumption 1 and the de￿nition of O s in (19) that,
for given s￿





and the supplier’s payoff is maximised by providing types s 2 [s; O s￿/
with variety j 6D k and s 2 .O s￿;s￿
k] with variety k. (The supplier has the same payoff from
providing the two varieties to O s￿, as well as from providing k and not providing to s￿
k, and so is
indifferent as to which is done.) By (1) it is always worthwhile setting pl suf￿ciently high that
some s receive variety l if none receive variety h, so it cannot be optimal to have no provision
to any types. Thus sk > s. Moreover, from (3), the left-hand side of (23) is zero for s￿
k D s00 and
strictly negative for s￿
k > s00. But since in all cases ￿ ￿ 0, the right-hand side is non-negative,
so s￿
k ￿ s00, and is strictly positive for s￿
k > s when ￿ > 0, in which case s￿
k < s00. For ￿ > 0,
these imply an interior solution for s￿
k, so s￿
k must satisfy (23). For ￿ D 0, it cannot be ruled out
that s￿
k D s00, which will be at a boundary if also s00 D s. But, for sk D s00, the left-hand side
of (23) is zero, so (23) still holds with equality. If O s￿ > s, it is interior and hence must satisfy





D 0, that corresponds to the left-hand side of (22) being non-positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is numbered in parts that correspond to the parts of the
Proposition.
1. Suppose not. Then, either no variety is provided or only variety h is, which corresponds
to having variety l being j of Lemma 1 and variety h being k with O s￿ D s. The former is
inconsistent with the result of Lemma 1 that s￿
k > s. With the latter, by (1), the left-hand
side of (22) is strictly positive, which is again inconsistent with Lemma 1.
2. Suppose it is optimal to provide only variety l. This results in a value of the maximand
in (21) the same as having variety l being j of Lemma 1 and variety h being k with
O s￿ D s￿
k D s￿
l D s￿
j. Consider raising sh above s￿
l . From (21), the derivative of the















































































are strictly positive. But, by hypothesis, s￿
l satis￿es (23)
with k D l. Thus the welfare increase is positive if (24) is satis￿ed for s D s￿
l . Note that,
from (2) and (3), the numerator on the left-hand side of (24) is strictly greater than that
on the right-hand side for s 2 .s0;s]. Moreover, ch .s/￿cl .s/ strictly decreasing implies
c0
h .s/ < c0
l .s/, so the denominator on the left-hand side is strictly less than that on the
right-hand side. Thus, (24) certainly holds for all s 2 .s0;s].
3. Suppose it is optimal to have both varieties provided. With ch .s/￿cl .s/ strictly decreas-
ing, it follows from the de￿nition of O s in (19) that pl ￿cl .s/ > ph ￿ch .s/ for s 2 [s; O s/
25and pl ￿ cl .s/ < ph ￿ ch .s/ for s > O s, from which (a) follows directly. With that al-
location, condition (2), condition (3) and continuity imply that the left-hand side of (22)








so the right-hand side is non-negative given ￿ ￿ 0, and strictly positive for ￿ > 0 and
O s￿ > s. Thus O s￿ ￿ s0 and from Lemma 1 s￿
h ￿ s00, both with the inequality strict for










l .s/ > c0





















h. Moreover, it has already been shown that O s￿ ￿ s0
(with the inequality strict for ￿ > 0) so, again with c0
l .s/ > c0



























4. For ￿ D 0, (22) is satis￿ed for O s￿ D s0 and (23) for s￿
k D s￿
h D s00, for which the payoff W
in (20) corresponds to the ef￿cient level in (12) and must, therefore, be globally optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. With ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly increasing, it follows from the de￿nition
of O s in (19) that ph ￿ ch .s/ > pl ￿ cl .s/ for s 2 [s; O s/ and ph ￿ ch .s/ < pl ￿ cl .s/ for
s > O s, implying the allocation in Part 3(a). With that allocation, condition (1), condition (2)
and continuity imply that the left-hand side of (22) is non-positive for O s￿ ￿ s0. But, with
ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly increasing, c0
h .s/ > c0
l .s/ so the right-hand side is strictly positive for
￿ > 0 and O s￿ > s. Thus, for any interior solution with O s￿ > s when ￿ > 0, O s￿ > s0, as claimed
in Part 1.
For ￿ D 0, it follows from (1)-(3) that the only interior solution to (22) has O s￿ D s0. But,
with j D h and k D l, that would imply all types s (except s0) receiving the variety that is less
ef￿cient for their type. Since the supplier receives no rent in this case, the purchaser’s payoff
would be increased by having only one variety i provided so that at least some types receive
the variety that is ef￿cient for them, completing the proof of Part 1 for ￿ D 0 and, since s￿
i ￿ s00
from Lemma 1, Part 2.
It remains to prove Part 3(b). From Part 2, this case can apply only when ￿ > 0. It follows








. For ￿ > 0;
it was shown in Lemma 1 that O s￿ ￿ s￿
k and s￿
k < s00, so O s￿ < s00. With c0




















h. For O s￿ > s0,
again with c0
l .s/ < c0













































, so it would increase the purchaser’s
objective to reduce ph and have type s supplied with variety l.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part 1. With ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly decreasing, it follows from the
de￿nition of O s in (26) that pl ￿ cl .s/ > ph ￿ ch .s/ for s < O s and pl ￿ cl .s/ < ph ￿ ch .s/
26for 2 .O s;s], from which (a) follows directly. With that allocation, condition (1), condition
(2) and continuity imply that the left-hand side of (29) is non-negative for O s￿ ￿ s0. But with








so the right-hand side is strictly negative for
O s￿ < s when ￿ > 0. Thus, for any interior solution with O s￿ < s when ￿ > 0, it must be that
O s￿ > s0. For ￿ D 0, the unique solution to (29) has O s￿ D s0. Moreover, it follows from (26)









l .s/ > c0













h. Moreover, with O s￿ ￿ s0
(with the inequality strict for ￿ > 0) and c0
l .s/ > c0


























Part 2. For ￿ D 0, it is not optimal to provide both varieties for the same reasons as in the
proof of Proposition 3. For ￿ > 0 and ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly increasing, it follows from the
de￿nition of O s in (26) that ph ￿ ch .s/ > pl ￿ cl .s/ for s < O s and ph ￿ ch .s/ < pl ￿ cl .s/
for s 2 .O s;s], implying the allocation in (a). With that allocation, condition (2), condition
(3) and continuity imply that the left-hand side of (29) is non-negative for O s￿ ￿ s0. But, with
ch .s/ ￿ cl .s/ strictly increasing, c0
h .s/ > c0
l .s/ so the right-hand side is strictly negative
for O s￿ < s when ￿ > 0. Thus, for any interior solution with O s￿ < s when ￿ > 0, it must










l .s/ < c0





















h. For O s￿ < s0, again with c0
l .s/ < c0
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